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Abstract 
 
 
The main objective of this study is to propose an analytical framework to explain the major 
policy shifts that has characterized post-war Turkish economic development; divided into four 
phases, starting respectively in 1950, 1960, 1980, and 2001. Its main contribution is to 
incorporate external and internal factors into this framework within a broadly political 
economy perspective, attaching particular significance to the role of economic crises in 
moving from one phase to the other. While the role of external agents is identified as the main 
factor behind policy shifts, the role of domestic coalitions in support of policy regime in each 
phase is also recognized.  Drawing attention to the role of state in the impressive recent 
growth of countries such as China, India, and Ireland, the paper argues that there is still room 
for the state taking on a developmental role. The paper recommends that Turkey follows a 
similar path by improving state capacity not only with respect to its regulatory role but also in 
more developmental spheres, encompassing its redistributive and transformative role on the 
basis of a domestically-determined industrialization strategy. 
 
Keywords: State capacity, policy transformations, crises, multilateral institutions, 
distributional conflicts, regulation 
 
                                                 
1 This study is a forerunner of work in progress on a book by the authors on the post-war economic development 
of the Turkish economy. The authors wish that this essay and its Turkish version, which will be produced in due 
course, will generate constructive debate among students of the Turkish economy.    2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Turkish economic development in the post-war period has been characterized by significant 
structural transformation. At the same time, however, one can identify significant continuities 
such as cycles of populist expansionism, periodic crises and encounters with the IMF as one 
moves from one major policy phase to the other. The objective of the present study is to 
propose  a  conceptual  framework  for  understanding  the  major  policy  shifts  which  have 
occurred in post-war Turkish economic development, notably in the context of multi-party 
democracy which represents a major departure from the single party government of the inter-
war period. The proposed framework aims to account for this simultaneous mix of structural 
transformation and underlying continuities. Our central thesis is that Turkey, in the economic 
realm, represents a case of reactive state behavior. From a comparative perspective, reactive 
state behavior, which also appears to have characterized the policy stance of major Latin 
American countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, differs sharply from the more pro-
active  state  strategies  aimed  at  industrial  transformation,  which  seems  to  characterize  the 
development experiences of key East Asian hyper-growth cases such as Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan, and more recently the case of China. Parallel to the notion of the reactive state, 
our  central  contention  is  that  the  main  impetus  for  policy  transformation  in  Turkey  has 
originated  from  external  dynamics,  with  key  external  actors  playing  a  central  role  in 
accomplishing the transition from one policy phase to another. There is no doubt that there 
exist certain limits concerning the ability of external actors or external forces to engineer 
policy  transformation.  External  dynamics  need  to  be  integrated  with  domestic  factors  to 
provide a coherent explanation of major policy shifts. To be more precise, there must be a 
supporting  domestic  coalition  of  actors  to  render  a  major  policy  regime,  such  as  import-
substituting model of industrialization (ISI) in the 1960s and the 1970s or the neo-liberalism 
and market-based development during the 1980s and beyond, the hegemonic policy regime 
during a specific period. Periodic macroeconomic or financial crises have a particular role to 
play in our analytical schema in the sense that they signify that a particular policy regime is 
no longer sustainable and needs to be replaced by a new policy regime. Crises also strengthen 
the hand of external actors and break down the resistance of key elements of the previous 
domestic coalition. They also facilitate the emergence of a new domestic coalition favoring 
the implementation of the new policy regime in line with the overriding impetus provided by 
the major external actors. Crises also serve the function of breaking-down the distributional   3 
stalemate  which  emerges  towards  the  end  of  each  policy  phase,  thereby  facilitating  the 
transition to a new dominant policy regime.  
 
There is a vast literature on the post-war economic development of Turkey which has greatly 
enhanced our understanding of its pattern, main phases, as well as the main problems and 
issues involved.
2 We build on this stock of knowledge and attempt to cover the whole of the 
post-war  period,  by  integrating  the  post-2001  crisis  developments  into  our  analysis.  By 
bringing  the  internal  and  external  factors  that  have  affected  economic  development  and 
incorporating  political  developments  and  the  role  of  economic  crises  into  our  proposed 
analytical framework, we make a modest effort to provide a more comprehensive treatment of 
the  major  structural  transformations  involved  in  the  context  of  the  shifting  development 
discourse. 
 
The  analytical  framework  proposed  is  discussed  in  detail  in  sections  2  and  3.  Then,  the 
framework proposed is employed as a basis for explaining the four basic policy regimes that 
seem to characterize post-war Turkish experience in the era of multi-party democracy from 
1950s to the present era in Section 4. Section 4, in effect, represents the substantive empirical 
component of the paper where the specific linkages between external actors and influences 
and supporting domestic coalitions are given precise meaning in the context of individual 
policy epochs. Although our analysis effectively ends with the transition to the latest policy 
regime  in  the  post-2001  period,  we  briefly  speculate  about  this  period  and  consider  the 
question of whether a real rupture has taken place, which differentiates this particular phase 
from earlier phases in the history of Turkish economic policy. In sections 5 and 6, we extend 
our discussion beyond the specific Turkish experience to the general realm of comparative 
development performance. Our central message in the present context is that the nature and 
quality of state intervention continues to be a critical variable in accounting for differences in 
development performance in the age of neo-liberal globalization, and notably, in terms of 
differentiating  between  cases  of  hyper-growth  and  moderate  growth  cases  among  late-
industrializing economies. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
2 See, for instance Hershlag (1968), Tezel (1994), Boratav ( 2003), Keyder (1987), Kepenek and Yentürk (2005), 
Kazgan (2001), Yentürk (2003) and Yeldan (2001).    4 
2.  Explaining  Major  Policy  Shifts  in  the  Context  of    Reactive  State 
Behavior: An Analytical Framework 
 
“Late development” is a characteristic which is not unique to developing countries in the post-
war  context.  Many  countries  currently  classified  in  the  advanced  industrialized  country 
category were confronted with similar problems of catching up with the leading countries of 
their time.
3 France and Germany in the 19th century and Japan in the immediate post-war 
period  are  typical  cases  of  currently  advanced  industrialized  countries  which  have  been 
confronted with the challenge of late industrialization. Recent research reveals that none of 
the successful cases of late-industrialization, especially during the critical take-off phase of 
development, were integrated to the world market under free trade conditions. Active state-
backed  industrialization  and  the  nurturing  of  a  private  entrepreneurial  class  under  state 
protection constituted a critical element of their successful catching up process.
4 Clearly, the 
balance between state actors and private business shifts over time and the pendulum swings in 
favor of powerful private actors as these countries reach a certain level of maturity in their 
industrialization process. Hence, the fact that states play an exceptionally important role in the 
process of late industrialization given the fundamental initial weaknesses of a late developing 
country  in  terms  of  its  technological,  educational  and  entrepreneurial  capacities  is  a 
commonly accepted proposition. What is important in the present context, however, is that 
states themselves can exhibit considerable variation in the process of late industrialization. 
The very differences in the nature of such states, the mode of their interactions with key 
elements of their societies can result in significant differences in the nature and quality of 
state  intervention.  The  natural  corollary  of  this  is  that  such  differences  tend  to  produce 
significant contrast in development performance among individual countries over time. 
 
Our focus in this study is on a specific sub-set of state behavior or mode of intervention in the 
context of late industrialization. The sub-set of states that we have in mind are the kind of 
“reactive states”, which tend to be more representative of late development in the context of 
Turkey or the key countries of Latin America representing a sharp contrast with the pro-active 
or the developmental states that seem to be a key feature of the East Asian region. At a certain 
                                                 
3 See Gerschenkron ( 1962) for a detailed exposition of the concept of late development. For a more recent 
application of the concept in the East Asian context as well as other national settings see Amsden ( 1989, 2001). 
4 See Chang (2002) and Shafaeddin (2005) for details on the industrialization experience of some of these  
countries and in particular the role of the state in this process.   5 
level  of  abstraction,  there  is  a  certain  similarity between  the  experiences  of  the  so-called 
reactive states and the more strategically-oriented, pro-active developmental states of the East 
Asian  region.  In  the  case  of  reactive  states,  one  can  also  discern  significant  element  of 
interventionism  in  the  direction  of  correcting  market  failures  both  directly  through  an 
extensive public enterprise sector, especially in the early stages of development, as well as 
through indirect intervention in the operation of the market mechanism using a large range of 
instruments. Perhaps, the central difference between the reactive states and their more pro-
active counterparts in East Asia, for example, is that the former are characterized by a much 
lower degree of “state autonomy”. In other words, reactive states tend to be more fragmented 
and enjoy a much lower degree of relative autonomy from key domestic constituencies such 
as  the  emerging  industrialists.  Hence,  their  ability  to  overcome  sectional  conflicts  and 
concentrate their attention on longer-term strategic goals such as developing internationally 
competitive export industries tend to be more limited. Moreover, reactive states tend to move 
closely with the dominant norms in policy behavior accepted in major centers of international 
decision making. Reactive state behavior by definition means going along with the acceptable 
line of policy thinking as opposed to deviating from such norms in certain critical respects. 
 
Our explanations of major policy shifts in late industrializing countries, which display the 
common characteristic of reactive state behavior are based on the following integrated set of 
propositions. 
 
Proposition One: External actors or influences play a disproportionately important role 
in accounting for major policy shifts. 
 
There is no doubt that the role of external actors or influences needs to be disaggregated for 
proper analysis. Take the case of key external actors. This naturally includes the case of the 
leading or hegemonic power in the international system which in the post-war context has 
been the United States. There is no doubt that the United States as the global hegemon has 
played and continues to play a critical role in the case of late developing countries, although 
its power nowadays is increasingly challenged by a group of countries such as China which 
are in the process of moving from the “semi-periphery” to the “center” of the international 
economic system. The United States has exerted its economic influence both directly through 
economic and military assistance, and also indirectly through key international organizations 
such as the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the WTO and so on-institutions over which it   6 
can  exercise  a  disproportionate  degree  of  influence.  Moreover,  the  global  hegemon  can 
influence  the  development  trajectories  of  individual  countries  not  only  through  its 
manipulation of material incentives but also through the development of ideas. Dominant 
thinking on development typically originate from the “center”, in which the academic and 
policy  making  elite  in  the  United  States  occupy  a  central  position.  Powerful  ideas  on 
development then tend to be institutionalized and transmitted to the periphery at particular 
moments of time through key international organizations. In the context of neo-liberalism, for 
example, strict conditionality of IMF stabilization policies and structural adjustment loans of 
the World Bank have been the most effective mechanisms transmitting these ideas to the 
developing country context.  
 
Proposition Two: External influences do not refer exclusively to the global hegemon or 
to key multilateral organizations. Key regional organizations as well as powerful private 
actors also play a critical role. 
 
This  proposition  assumes  particular  validity  in  the  European  context  where  the  European 
Community or more recently the European Union has performed and continues to perform a 
central role in transforming the economic and political structures of countries in the European 
periphery,  notably  those countries  which  enjoy  the  concrete  prospect  of  EU  membership. 
Regional dynamics are also operative in other parts of the world, although they are not as 
institutionalized and powerful as in the EU context. Regional factors tend to interact with 
global forces. Given that Trans-Atlantic interdependence has been the norm in the post-war 
period,  global  and  regional  forces  have  tended  to  move  in  the  same  direction  and  have 
generally  tended  to  strengthen  the  impact  of  one  another.  At  the  same  time,  the  relative 
strength  of  global  pressures  and  regional  dynamics  have  tended  to  vary  over  time  for 
individual  countries  as  well  as  displaying  significant  variations  across  the  spectrum  of 
developing  countries.  Moving  beyond  the  regional  realm,  powerful  private  actors  also 
constitute a significant external force. The force of private actors has become increasingly 
striking over time reaching a peak of its influence in the era of financial globalization. The set 
of private actors which has now a major role in the policy process includes not only powerful 
transnational corporations (TNCs) investing directly in developing countries but also a large 
number of other private foreign investors, often small investors, actively participating in the 
capital markets of developing countries. The transnational financial alliance also includes, last 
but not the least, international banks and private rating agencies, which regularly monitor the   7 
policy  process  in  individual  countries.  Through  their  analysis  of  the  credit-worthiness  of 
individual countries, such agencies are able to exert a disproportionate impact over the policy 
process of individual countries. Aggregating all these elements together, we may be able to 
refer to a “transnational power bloc”, which forms the driving force or the central element in 
explaining the dominance of particular policies as well as policy shifts over time. The danger 
here is that we may exaggerate the degree of unity and coherence of this “transnational power 
bloc” and, in the process, fail to pay sufficient attention to the possible conflicts of interest 
between the different segments constituting this power bloc. 
 
Proposition Three: External Dynamics per se are insufficient to explain major policy 
shifts.  The  development  of  a  supportive  domestic  policy  coalition  is  crucial  in  this 
context. 
 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  global  or  regional  forces  have  become  increasingly  important  in 
accounting  for  policy  shifts  over  time,  the  effectiveness  of  such  forces  in  terms  of 
accomplishing  a  major  shift  in  policy  requires  the  parallel  development  of  a  supportive 
domestic coalition. In this context we need to make a distinction between the narrowly-based 
“policy-coalition” of interests which directly benefit from the shift of policy regime and the 
benefits associated with the newly-instituted policy regime.
5 To give an example, in the case 
of  import-substituting  industrialization,  the  policy  coalition  included  the  key  bureaucratic 
agencies such as the planning bureaus which assumed a central importance during the course 
of implementing the strategy, state enterprise managers, domestically oriented industrialists 
benefiting from protectionism and other subsidies as well as organized labor employed in key 
import-substituting sectors. In some cases, for example in the case of Brazil and Mexico, 
inward-oriented  TNCs  have  become  a  central  element  of  the  ruling  ISI  policy  coalition. 
Hence, we may talk of a “domestic power bloc” in line with a “transnational power bloc” with 
the qualification once again that there may be significant tensions or conflicts of interests 
between the different elements constituting this power bloc. The important point to emphasize 
is that the emergence of a dominant policy coalition may not be enough in sustaining the 
policy especially in the context of more open and democratic regimes. Unlike the case of 
authoritarian regimes, the narrow policy coalitions needs to be extended and enlarged to build 
successful electoral coalitions to render the policy regime sustainable. To provide a specific 
                                                 
5 For an insightful examination of the role of domestic coalition building in Turkish economic development in 
the 1980s, see Waterbury (1992).   8 
example, the narrow ISI policy coalition in a broadly democratic environment (for example, 
Turkey in the 1960s and the 1970s) had to be enlarged to include agricultural interests and to 
some extent small and medium sized enterprises, which were not formally part of the ISI 
coalition. Clearly, the enlargement of the policy coalition creates additional complications 
which we shall consider in the following section. 
 
Proposition  Four:  Transnational  actors  or  “policy  entrepreneurs”  may  play  an 
important  conduit  role  in  terms  of  linking  the  interests  of  the  transnational  and 
domestic policy coalitions or “power blocs”. The importance of these actors becomes 
particularly  significant  in  the  context  of  institutionalizing  neo-liberal  globalization 
during the more recent era. 
 
In explaining major policy shifts and the institutionalization of the new policy regime, there is 
a need for an intermediating set of actors, which play a central role in tying the interests of the 
external and domestic components of the broad transnational coalition and helping to build 
mutual trust among the key actors involved in the process. Typically, individuals who have 
been educated in dominant academic establishments and/or have worked in major multilateral 
financial institutions are typically brought in to leadership positions in their home countries. 
Striking examples of this phenomenon in the Turkish context include Turgut Özal in the first 
wave of neo-liberal restructuring in Turkey during the 1980s and “Özal’s princes”, the key 
American-educated bureaucrats who occupied major positions in the new layers of neo-liberal 
bureaucracy such as the Privatization Administration, public sector banks and the Central 
Bank during the same period ( Öniş, 2004). The case of Kemal Derviş, at the time serving as a 
vice president at the World Bank, who was called in to serve as the economic overlord and to 
head of the “strong economy program” in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis is equally striking. 
Latin  American  experiences  with  neoliberal  restructuring  are  full  of  examples  of  critical 
individuals who have played a similar role between the transnational and domestic policy 
elites. Perhaps the best-known examples include Domingho Cavallo, the key technocrat who 
played  a  central  role  in  instituting  the  Argentine  neo-liberal  program,  and  notably  the 
convertibility plan, of the 1990s; Pedro Aspe who was a central figure in Mexican neo-liberal 
restructuring,  and  finally  the  “Chicago  Boys”,  the  Chicago  University  educated  group  of 
technocrats who played a central role in the first wave of neo-liberal  restructuring in the 
highly authoritarian setting of Pinochet’s Chile during the 1970s. 
   9 
 
3. Crises, Policy Choices and Path Dependence 
 
Periodic macroeconomic crises play an integral role in our explanation of major policy shifts 
over time for a number of important reasons:  
 
(a) Crises often constitute a clear signal that the underlying policy regime is unsustainable.  
Macroeconomic or financial crises in Turkey, Latin America and elsewhere often manifest 
themselves as balance of payments or external debt crises with the natural implication that the 
existing policy regime is unable to generate the foreign exchange resources needed to sustain 
the economy at a steady growth path. Typically, however, deeper forces are at work forming 
the background to such crises. Major economic crises, as the Turkish experience in the late 
1970s, in 1994 and in 2000-2001 clearly illustrates, are also fiscal and distributional crises. 
An unsustainable fiscal deficit in itself is a sign that there are major distributional pressures on 
governments  originating  from  various  segments  of  society  such  as  business,  labor,  and 
farmers and so on which governments increasingly fail to handle. Attempts by major interest 
groups  in  society  to  claim  a  larger  share  of  the  pie  naturally  lead  to  a  situation  where 
government  expenditures  increase  more  rapidly  than  government  revenues.  Large  fiscal 
deficits become a major driving force in the emergence of a  chronic inflationary process 
which undermines the competitiveness of the economy vis-à-vis the external competitors. In 
such an environment, the balance of payments situation becomes increasingly vulnerable with 
stagnant exports, rising imports and falling foreign exchange reserves. For example, Turkey’s 
growing fiscal deficits in the face of growing distributional claims from different segments of 
society together with attempt to push import-substituting industrialization into intermediate 
and  capital  goods  in  the  1970s  increased  the  import  dependence  of  the  economy.  Heavy 
import-dependence in the face of stagnant exports brought about a severe balance of payments 
crisis and the subsequent collapse of this model of industrialization by the end of the decade. 
In the more recent era of financial globalization, the problems have been compounded by the 
fact  that  such  economies  have  become  heavily  dependent  on  fragile  flows  of  short-term 
capital. Hence, it is not surprising that countries, which find themselves in a vicious circle of 
fiscal and distributional crises, tend to be even more vulnerable to a balance of payments 
crisis  in  an  environment  of  heavy  capital  mobility  and  dependence  on  short-term  capital   10 
flows. No wonder, therefore, that the frequency of crises has increased in the age of financial 
globalization as the post-1980 experience of Turkey clearly testifies. 
 
(b) Frequent crises highlight the institutional weaknesses of countries in terms of their ability 
to  manage  underlying  distributional  conflicts  or  pressures.  We  may  hypothesize  that 
countries, which are in the middle of the spectrum between the two extremes of established 
authoritarian regimes and established democracies find themselves in a particularly vulnerable 
situation in this context. One of the deficiencies of countries, which are in the process of 
moving from democratic transition to democratic consolidation is the absence of sufficiently 
strong institutional checks and balances. The presence of such checks and balances would 
allow governments to manage the underlying distributional conflicts within the parameters of 
parliamentary democracy, a process which would also help them to contain fiscal deficits 
within permissible levels. It is also important to bring into the picture the distinction that we 
have already introduced between narrow policy coalitions and the broad electoral coalitions in 
this context. Established authoritarian regimes such as South Korea in the 1960s enjoyed a 
natural advantage in the sense that strategic policy choices could be made through the consent 
of the narrow policy coalition (namely state and business elites) without the need to engineer 
a broad electoral coalition. In the Turkish case, in contrast, the narrow policy coalition during 
the same-period was not sufficient to sustain the strategy. The narrow policy coalition had to 
be supported by the build-up of a broader electoral coalition. Within the parameters of an 
emerging parliamentary democracy, Turkey faced the dilemma that the build-up of such a 
broad  electoral  coalition  raised  acute  problems  of  distributional  management  and  fiscal 
disequilibrium which, in turn, helped to undermine the sustainability of the basic strategy 
adopted. 
 
(c) Crises play a transformative role by ending the existing distributional stalemate and by 
allowing  the  emergence  of  a  new  policy  coalition  to  emerge  especially  by  empowering 
external  actors  relative  to  domestic  actors.  Major  crises  have  significant  distributional 
repercussions. For example, the crisis of the late 1970s was resolved in the early 1980s by the 
collapse of the ISI coalition. The major distributional burden of the shift from an ISI based 
model  to  an  export-based  strategy  in  Turkey  fell  on  wage  and  salary-earners  and  the 
agricultural sector. The crisis has enabled key external actors such as the IMF, the World 
Bank and the OECD to play a major transformative role as a new export coalition gradually 
replaced the previous ISI coalition and the most dramatic policy shifts in this process involved   11 
the exclusion of organized labor. In the absence of crises, the existing coalition supporting a 
particular policy regime tends to display considerable resistance to change in spite of the fact 
that there might be clear signs indicating that the existing policy regime might no longer be 
viable or sustainable. This was clearly the case in Turkey towards the late 1970s. A major 
shift to an export-oriented strategy failed to materialize until the country actually experienced 
a major economic breakdown. 
 
(d) Crises also imply that countries postpone major policy choices with the result that action 
is delayed and the policy choice becomes more limited once the crisis actually occurs.  The 
experience of East Asian economies is quite instructive here in the sense that such countries 
have been able to accomplish major policy choices voluntarily without actually experiencing 
major  economic  crises.  A  good  example  is  South  Korea’s  voluntary  transition  to  export-
oriented growth strategy in the early 1960s at a time when most late industrializing countries 
opted for a prolonged import-substituting strategy. This relatively early shift enabled South 
Korea to engineer a major breakthrough in terms of export performance, which proved to be 
the foundation of its hyper-growth experience allowing it to prosper much more rapidly than 
the vast majority of late developing countries. By similar logic, one can conjecture that if 
Turkey  had  been  able  to  accomplish  a  voluntary  transition  to  an  export-oriented  growth 
strategy in a planned fashion during the early 1970s, as opposed to a forced transition in the 
form of a reactive response to a major crisis, Turkey’s development performance would have 
reached a higher plateau as a result. Delayed policy response which takes place after a crisis 
actually  occurs  means  that  the  range  of  policy  options  tends  to  be  much  more  limited 
especially in an environment where key external actors like the IMF assume disproportionate 
power and importance. To provide a concrete example in this context, in the absence of crises 
countries such as Malaysia and Chile were able to experiment successfully with “heterodox 
policy instruments” such as controls on short term inflows or outflows of capital. In contrast, 
such an instrument was not a realistic choice for Turkey in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis 
when an IMF-backed stabilization program took central stage. 
 
(e) Crises are inherently costly in social, political and humanitarian terms.  Even though we 
recognize the transformative impact of crises, we should also underline the fact that crises 
tend to be extremely costly in terms of their human and socio-political consequences. In many 
Latin American countries and Turkey, major macroeconomic crises have been associated with 
the breakdown of democratic regimes and their replacement by highly repressive military   12 
regimes. The interruption of the democratic process in this manner has no doubt represented a 
major setback for the efforts of these countries to make the transition to becoming a full 
democracy.  Even in the more recent cases of crises, where the democratic regimes have 
tended to be more robust than in the past, the main burden of adjustment has tended to fall 
disproportionately on weaker segments of society. What is quite striking from this discussion 
is that the emergence of major policy shifts and the rise of the associated policy coalitions do 
not involve simply a technical, but also an intensely political process. 
 
 
 
    4.  Major  Policy  Shifts  in  Turkey  during  the  Multi-Party  Era:  Towards  an 
Integrated Explanation 
 
The objective of the present section is to construct an empirical counterpart to the analytical 
framework developed in the previous sections. Our aim is not to provide a comprehensive 
overview of each policy phase. Instead, what we aim to do is to paint a stylized picture of the 
four main policy phases that we identify (Table 1) in order to illustrate the relevance or the 
applicability of our explanatory framework, particularly means of explaining the transition 
from one particular phase to another. We consider each policy phase in turn. 
 
(A) Transition from the Etatism of the Inter-war period to Agriculture-Led Integration 
to the World Economy: The Democrat Party Era of the 1950s 
 
1950s mark a new era in the political and economic development of contemporary Turkey. 
This is a period which effectively constitutes the beginning of representative democracy in 
Turkey. In other words, it represented the end of the monopoly of single party government 
that characterized the inter-War period. The significance of the period also originates from the 
fact that “etatism”, the state-led industrialization strategy, as the hegemonic strategy of the 
inter-War era is replaced by a new economic strategy which placed primary emphasis on 
liberalization and a strategy of integration into the world market on the basis of agricultural 
exports.  The  emphasis  of  the  new  economic  model  of  the  1950s  was  on  agricultural 
development  with  a  parallel  focus  on  the  development  of  transport  and  communication 
networks. The industrialization objective, confined to some progress in light consumption 
goods such as food and textiles, was relegated very much to the background.  The aim of the   13 
new strategy was clearly to facilitate a process of integration both in domestic markets and to 
the global economy. In accounting for this major change of direction during our first policy 
phase,  both  external  and  domestic  factors  were  at  work.  During  the  post-war  period,  the 
United States emerged as the new hegemonic power and in the new Cold War context, with 
the Soviet Union posing a major security threat, Turkey found itself firmly located in the 
Western camp. In retrospect, the shift to the new strategy highlighted Turkey’s very first 
encounter with the notion of “aid conditionality” meaning external resources will be available 
on the condition that policy changes required by the donor are made. Turkey in the 1950s 
became an important recipient of Marshall Aid provided by the US to important allies in the 
emerging Cold War context. Yet, access to aid necessitated a major shift of direction in terms 
of economic strategy. The key international institution that played an intermediating role in 
this context was the IBRD (namely the World Bank). The “Thornburg Report” (Thornburg et 
al. 1949) and the subsequent country report produced under the auspices of the IBRD ( IBRD, 
1951) represented  major critiques of the etatist strategy and outlined the key elements of 
reform. The strategy that the newly elected Menderes government adopted in 1950 was very 
much in line with the recommendations of the Thornburg Report. 
 
Although a major impetus for change originated from the drastically transformed international 
context of the post-war period, it would nevertheless be unfair to place all the emphasis on 
external actors and influences. Important changes have also been taking place domestically 
which also helped to undermine the etatist strategy towards the end of the 1940s. The newly 
elected Democrat Party under the leadership of Adnan Menderes represented a broad coalition 
of interests involving major landowners and commercial interests on the one hand and the 
broad spectrum of peasants and farmers, on the other. Rapid expansion of the cultivated land 
area  accompanied  by  rapid  mechanization  and  generous  price  support  policies  by  the 
government  were  key  instruments  of  this  strategy.  This  broad  domestic  coalition  also 
welcomed the new strategy proposed by the key external actors. Even though there was an 
element  of  conditionality  imposed  by  the  external  actors  involved,  important  domestic 
constituencies  also  provided  significant  support  to  this  policy.  The  changing  political 
environment in the early years of parliamentary democracy enabled the new political elite to 
implement this strategy quite effectively. Indeed, the early years of the 1950s represented one 
of the most favorable growth episodes in the history of the Turkish economy. The period, 
however, also marked the beginning of a pattern which was to be repeated frequently during 
the course of successive decades. After a promising beginning, aided by some aspects of a   14 
generally favorable external environment such as the buoyant demand in world markets for 
Turkish agricultural exports during the Korean War as well as favorable weather conditions, 
the strategy encountered increasing problems during the course of the decade. Growing fiscal 
disequilibrium and rising inflation helped to undermine the balance of payments equilibrium 
with the result that a major economic crisis became inevitable by the late 1950s. Turkey 
experienced  its  very  first  encounter  with  the  IMF  in  1958,  a  decade  or  so  later  than  its 
encounter  with  the  World  Bank.  The  collapse  in  the  economic  realm  was  not  the  only 
consequence for Turkey; the nascent democratic regime was interrupted by the military coup 
of 1960, too. 
 
Table  1:  Key  Turning  Points  in  Turkish  Economic  Development  and  the  Principal 
Driving Forces 
 
Phases 
Global  Context  and 
the  Key  External 
Actors 
Dominant 
Development 
Discourse 
Domestic  Policy 
Coalitions 
Phase  I:  Transition 
from  Etatism  to 
Agriculture-based 
Integration  to  the 
World Economy: The 
Agrarian Populism of 
the 1950s 
US  as  the  new 
hegemonic  power; 
World  Bank/IBRD  is 
the  key  actor;  Direct 
US  aid  under  the 
Marshall  Plan  based 
on  policy  guidelines 
provided by the IBRD  
Benefit  of  integration 
and  participation  in 
the  capitalist  world 
economy;  advantage 
of  market-based 
development  as 
opposed  to  the 
inefficiency of Soviet 
style  central  planning 
hand in hand with the 
emergence  of 
structuralist 
development 
economics 
recognizing  the  role 
of  state  in 
development 
A  coalition  of  major 
land  owners  and 
peasants  favoring  an 
agriculture  –based 
strategy;  as  well  as  the 
emerging  industrial 
bourgeoisie;  the  ruling 
party  representing  this 
new  coalition  of 
interests 
Phase  II:  Transition 
from  a  broadly 
liberal  policy  regime 
to  a  protectionist 
import-substituting 
industrialization 
strategy in the 1960s 
and the 1970s 
 
 
 
OECD/World  Bank; 
EEC  becoming 
important  but  still  in 
the background in the 
Transatlantic  alliance 
dominated by the US 
“National 
developmentalism”  in 
a  mixed  economy 
context; the existence 
of  pervasive  market 
failures  and  the  need 
for  systematic  state 
intervention  and 
planning  for  rapid 
industrialization 
became  the  occupied 
mode of thinking  
Emerging  industrialists, 
the  big  bureaucratic 
agencies responsible for 
implementing  the 
national 
developmentalist  model 
as  well  as  organized 
labor    form  the 
backbone of the new ISI 
coalition    15 
Phase  III:  Collapse 
of ISI and the rise of 
the  Neo-liberal 
Model with emphasis 
on Liberalization and 
De-regulation:  The 
post-1980  era  until 
the  outbreak  of  the 
2000-2001 crisis 
World Bank, the IMF 
and  the  OECD;  geo-
strategic  importance 
of  Turkey  in  the 
ongoing  Cold  War 
context  in  the  1980s; 
EU  became  more 
important  in  the 
1990s, but still a weak 
anchor  
The  emergence  of 
Washington 
Consensus;  emphasis 
shifts  from  market  to 
government  failures 
in  development  with 
the  logical  corollary 
that  correct  policy 
involves  extensive 
liberalization  and 
privatization  
 
 
Export-oriented 
industrialists,  including 
small and medium sized 
enterprises  in  the  so-
called Anatolian Tigers, 
financial  interests  as 
well as  elements of the 
new  neo-liberal 
bureaucracy 
Phase  IV:  Neo-
liberalism  with  a 
Regulatory  State 
Component:The 
Post-2001 period 
IMF  and  the  EU  as 
the  dominant  actors 
with  the  World  Bank 
somewhat  in 
background; 
continued  strategic 
importance of Turkey 
for the US in the post-
Cold War and the post 
9/11 global context 
The emergence of the 
post-Washington 
Consensus;  shift  of 
emphasis  to  the  need 
for  an  effective 
regulatory state as the 
basic  ingredient  of 
market based reforms  
Export-oriented  big 
business  becoming 
increasingly 
transnational  in  its 
operations;  forming  an 
alliance with a growing 
group  of  transnational 
investors;  export 
oriented  small  and 
medium  sized 
businessmen  with 
financial  interests; 
growing segments of the 
new  regulatory 
bureaucratic  agencies, 
institutions  like  the 
Competition  Board, 
Central  Bank,  and  the 
Bank  Regulations  and 
Supervisory  Board 
occupying  the 
prestigious  positions  on 
the  bureaucratic  arm  of 
the  neo-liberal  state 
apparatus.  
 
 
 
(B)  The  Transition  to  Protectionism  and  Domestic  Market-Based  Industrialization 
Strategy of the 1960s and the 1970s: the ISI Era 
 
In  retrospect,  Turkey’s  shift  of  direction  in  the  1960s  after  only  a  decade  seems  rather 
surprising  and  requires  an  explanation.  Clearly,  several  influences  were  operative  which 
collectively explain this dramatic U-turn in a neo-etatist direction. Again starting with the 
external  context,  we  may  conceptualize  the  Turkish  experience  in  the  1960s  as  Turkey’s   16 
delayed encounter with the “Keynesian Revolution” in the West. The new Constitution of 
1961 had a major emphasis on the extension of social rights and the idea of planned economic 
development. This new outlook clearly endorsed the key role of the state as a major agent of 
economic and social transformation and highlighted the impact of the Keynesian Revolution 
which had a deep impact in the United States and Western Europe in the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Furthermore, the major international institutions such as the World Bank increasingly found 
itself more receptive to the ideas of infant industry protectionism, at least on a temporary 
basis,  as  well  as  the  idea  of  planned  development  as  a  means  of  fostering  rapid 
industrialization and development. For the United States, the need to increase the pace of 
development in the periphery of the capitalist world economy was firmly rooted in the logic 
of  Cold  War  rivalry,  with  the  threat  of  the  spread  of  communism  creating  an  important 
impetus  for  the  tolerance  of  more  interventionist  strategies  in  the  emerging  states  of  the 
developing world. The growing power of TNCs originating in the US, finding a lucrative base 
for investment in the large and protected home markets of the newly industrializing countries 
such as Brazil and Mexico also explain in part the growing receptivity on the part of the 
United  States  to  the  adoption  of  ISI-style  development  strategies.  Hence,  turning  to  the 
Turkish experience, the changing external context produced a favorable environment for the 
adoption of a new strategy and the fact that the old strategy had been discredited by a major 
financial crisis also helped to produce the necessary space within which the new strategy 
could be institutionalized. The key external actor which was directly involved in the policy 
process and the development of the new planning bureaucracy was this time the OECD, with 
Jan  Tinbergen,  the  Nobel  Prize  winning  economist,  initially  playing  a  central  role  in  the 
design of Turkish five year plans. 
 
Again,  however,  we  need  to  turn  our  attention  to  the  domestic  context  to  provide  the 
necessary balance. In the domestic sphere, we observe the emergence of an ISI or a national 
developmentalist coalition which favored the new strategy. This new coalition embodied the 
rising  industrialists  of  the  1960s,  who  were  making  the  transition  from  landownership  or 
commercial  entrepreneurship  to  industrial  entrepreneurship,  a  process  which,  indeed  had 
started  earlier,  under  the  creeping  protectionism  of  the  late  1950s.  The  coalition  also 
embodied key  elements of the bureaucratic elite which had been marginalized during the 
Menderes  era,  but has  managed to regain its status following the military intervention of 
1960.  Last  but  not  least,  organized  labor,  which  received  significant  benefits  in  terms  of 
expansion of social rights under the new Constitution of 1961, became another member of this   17 
nascent coalition. In contrast, farmers and peasants, for example, were excluded from the 
basic ISI policy coalition, but given the numbers involved, governments in power under the 
constraints  of  parliamentary  democracy  had  to  resort  to  policies  to  bring  the  agricultural 
population into their broad electoral coalitions, particularly in the periods leading to general 
elections. 
 
The  approach  involving  planned  industrialization  or  planned  development  was  often 
portrayed as a reaction to the uncoordinated expansionism of the Menderes era. The basic 
logic was to industrialize, moving stage by stage to higher levels of industrialization without 
undermining  balance  of  payments  equilibrium.  The  strategy  was  quite  effective  over  the 
period 1963-1977 in terms of accomplishing relatively high rates of economic growth and 
substantial structural change. Industrial entrepreneurship in Turkey was clearly the product of 
this particular phase of national development, during which both the private enterprises and 
state economic enterprises played a significant and complementary role. Again, the problem 
as in the previous era was that governments were not able to achieve sustainable growth. 
Rather reminiscent of the pattern of the late 1950s, the Turkish economy experienced another 
wave of fiscal disequilibrium and rising inflation. The outcome was a much deeper balance of 
payments and debt crisis in the late 1970s, judged by the standards of the previous crisis. This 
crisis may also be explained by the fact that Turkey encountered deep external shocks in the 
form  of  successive  oil  price  hikes  in  the  1970s.  The  crisis  pinpointed  once  again  the 
deficiencies  of  Turkish  democracy  and  the  inability  of  governments  in  power  to  manage 
distributional conflicts within the institutional boundaries of parliamentary democracy in such 
a way that the management of these conflicts would be compatible with the goals of fiscal 
equilibrium and sustained economic growth. 
 
In line with our discussion, Turkish state’s policy during the 1960s and the 1970s was very 
much in line with our notion of the “reactive state”. Turkey followed the route of the majority 
of late industrializing countries during this period in terms of pursuing a prolonged import-
substituting industrialization strategy. In this respect, Turkish development experience was 
much more in conformity with Latin America than East Asia. Arguably, we can classify the 
Turkish state as a fragmented developmental state enjoying a much lower degree of autonomy 
relative to the key societal actors such as the big business as compared with its East Asian 
counterparts  in  South  Korea  and  Taiwan.  Unlike  the  case  of  the  East  Asian  states,  the 
bureaucratic arm of the domestic policy coalition never had the upper hand. Indeed, the East   18 
Asian states were able to display a much more pro-active behavior in terms of their ability to 
engineer major shifts in the direction of export–oriented industrialization without actually 
experiencing  the  types  of  crises  that  Turkey  or  the  major  Latin  American  countries  have 
experienced.  
 
(C) The Collapse of the ISI Model and Turkey’s Encounters with Neo-liberalism and the 
Washington Consensus: the 1980s and the 1990s 
 
The third policy phase in our analytical schema corresponds roughly to the first two decades 
of neo-liberalism. Our general framework involving the combination of external dynamics 
and domestic coalitions is once again relevant in this context. Starting again with the external 
realm, the late 1970s are marked with disillusionment with the Keynesian Consensus in the 
North and the parallel process of formidable difficulties with the application of ISI strategies 
in the South. The late 1970s mark the rise of neo-liberalism as the hegemonic development 
discourse. The major Washington institutions increasingly embrace the basic message of neo-
liberalism  and  incorporate  the  key  neo-liberal  principles  of  market-liberalization  and 
privatization into their conditional policy packages. Indeed, Turkey is one of the countries 
which become a testing ground for neo-liberal principles in the early 1980s. Key international 
institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD have been collectively involved in 
Turkey’s neo-liberal restructuring process. The collective power of these actors to instigate 
policy  change  became  even  more  striking  once  the  previous  model  had  been  discredited 
through a major crisis in the late 1970s and the country became heavily dependent on external 
financial  inflows.  The  collective  interests  of  major  international  institutions  in  Turkish 
restructuring process were compounded by the country’s geo-strategic significance for the 
United States and its Western allies in a period marked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
signaling the continuation of the Cold War contest. 
 
On  the  domestic  front,  we  also  observe  the  collapse  of  the  ISI  coalition  and  its  gradual 
replacement  by  a  new  export-oriented  policy  coalition.  A  distinctive  characteristic  of  the 
domestic coalition during this phase was that it was basically built during and under the spurt 
of the policy transformation itself whereas in the previous phases the domestic coalition was 
developing before the policy change.
6 The twin forces of heavy external involvement under 
                                                 
6 Two prior short-lived attempts at export orientation in the early 1950s and early 1970s notwithstanding, it can 
safely be argued that a pro-export orientation constituency was notable for its absence when the ISI model   19 
severe  crisis  conditions  and  the  subsequent  military  intervention  were  instrumental  in 
preparing the ideal ground for the flourishing of the neo-liberal model. The key members of 
the ensuing coalition were the components of the business community, especially parts of big 
business, which were able to make the transition from domestic markets to exports as well as 
elements of the new bureaucracy which became central to the implementation of the neo-
liberal program. Turgut Özal was the leading transnational policy entrepreneur, occupying 
central stage in this particular coalition during the first decade of neo-liberal reforms in the 
1980s. Sidelined from this coalition were components of big business, which were unable to 
adjust  to  the  new  environment  as  well  as  elements  of  the  “classical”  or  the  “etatist” 
components of the economic bureaucracy such as the State Planning Organization (SPO). 
Perhaps the biggest loser in the new era was organized labor whose fortunes experienced 
major setbacks, especially during the early years of export-oriented growth when it was faced 
with  severe  repression  and  a  sharp  fall  in  real  wages.  In  the  early  years,  there  was  a 
considerable  rift  within  the  business  community  with  respect  to  export  versus  domestic 
market  coalition.  This  rift  became  less  pronounced  over  time  as  the  neo-liberal  policy 
coalition  expanded  to  include  a  larger  segment  of  both  big  and  small  businesses  which 
became  increasingly  export-oriented  in  their  operations.  The  new  policy  coalition  also 
included financial interests or the so called “rentiers” who clearly benefited from financial 
liberalization and high and rising domestic real interest rates. The fortunes of these groups 
improved  further  with  opportunities  to  lend  to  the  state  at  high  interest  rates  as  the 
government felt growing pressure to finance its rising fiscal deficits. 
 
In terms of economic performance, the period again was characterized by a boom-bust cycle 
rather reminiscent of the previous decades. Following a major recovery process in the early 
1980s, a process in which external assistance played an instrumental role, the process became 
increasingly unsustainable and prone to crises in the context of the 1990s. Once again, this 
highlighted the weaknesses in the regulatory capacities of the Turkish state and its inability to 
manage distributional conflicts within a broadly democratic environment. The Turkish state 
again displayed reactive behavior in conforming to the norms of the Washington Consensus 
rather wholeheartedly by opening up the capital account regime in 1989, without achieving 
the  necessary  degree  of  macroeconomic  stability  and  the  tight  regulation  of  the  financial 
                                                                                                                                                         
collapsed at the end of the 1970s. As Ebiri (1980) has documented in detail, the most influential segments of 
Turkish society just before the transition to the neo-liberal model in 1980 were in favor of the previous model. If 
anything, there were only isolated voices favoring an alternative path. See Krueger (1974) and Tekin ( 2006 ) on 
Turkey’s attempts at liberalization and export orientation before 1980.   20 
system. This constituted a sharp contrast with the experience of some other late-comers such 
as India and China which were much more gradual and selective in their approach to capital 
account  liberalization.  Particularly  the  second  decade  of  neo-liberalism  for  Turkey 
represented  the  unhappy  face  of  the  Washington  Consensus.  The  combination  of  fiscal 
instability  and  premature  capital  account  liberalization  in  the  absence  of  an  adequate 
regulatory framework were largely responsible for the eruption of successive economic crises 
in 1994, 2000 and 2001.  These crises have severely undermined Turkey’s overall economic 
performance, especially judged by the performance of some of the key “emerging markets”, 
notably those in Asia and the post-communist Eastern Europe. 
 
(D) Neo-liberalism with a Regulatory State Component: The Post-2001 Era 
 
The crisis of 2001 in Turkey was perhaps instrumental in ending the years of the Washington 
Consensus and marking the beginning of a new encounter with some of the key principles 
embodied  in  “Post-Washington  Consensus”.  A  mix  of  changing  global  dynamics  and  a 
parallel shift in domestic policy coalitions are at the heart of this transition to the new phase of 
the Turkish neo-liberal experiment. In terms of global dynamics, there is no doubt that there 
has been a broad disillusionment with Washington Consensus in action. Apart from its poor 
record  in  dealing  with  widespread  poverty  on  a  world  scale,  the  frequency  of  crises  in 
emerging  markets  during  the  1990s,  in  particular,  has  raised  very  serious  question  marks 
against one of the core principles of the Washington consensus, namely wholesale financial 
and capital account liberalization. Especially, in the aftermath of the major Asian financial 
crisis of 1997, the IMF has faced a serious identity crisis. This identity crisis, in turn, has been 
associated  with  a  shift  of  emphasis  in  the  direction  of  strengthening  institutions  and  the 
regulatory arm of the state. This shift of emphasis is also clearly reflected in the post-2001 
restructuring  process  of Turkey  with  major  attention  paid  to  creating  powerful  regulatory 
institutions in the realm of banking and finance as well as enhancing the power and autonomy 
of existing key institutions such as the Central Bank.  
 
In discussing the post-2001 restructuring process a useful formulation might be the IMF-US-
EU nexus. The active involvement of the IMF in Turkey’s post-2001 process was once again 
shaped by the security concerns of the US which became all the more important in the post- 
9/11 global environment. Furthermore, a distinct feature of the period was that the EU itself, 
for  the  first  time,  became  a  major  source  of  economic  and  political  change  in  Turkey,   21 
following the critical turning point in December 1999 involving the transition of Turkey to 
full candidate country status for full-membership. Becoming effective at the beginning of 
1996, the Customs union agreement represented an important landmark in Turkish economic 
history. Despite this fact, it is fair to say the real impact of the EU, in terms of both its 
conditions and incentives, is effectively felt in Turkey during phase IV, once the prospect of 
membership became a concrete possibility. The combination of IMF and EU conditionality 
has tended to reinforce one another. At the same time, the EU conditions have helped to 
generate a major wave of democratization reforms in Turkey. These are also important in 
terms of their economic repercussions in the direction of improving institutional quality and 
the rule of law, which probably would not have been possible if the IMF alone was involved 
in the restructuring process. 
 
Turning to the domestic plane, the new policy phase of policy regime had significant backing 
from key elements of big business as well as small and medium sized interests. Both elements 
favored  a  properly  regulated  macroeconomic  environment  as  a  necessary  condition  for 
achieving stability and sustainable growth, even if they were not equally enthusiastic about 
the  prospects  of  tight  regulation  of  the  banking  system.  The  business  component  of  the 
coalition was extended to include much stronger foreign investor presence compared to the 
previous  policy  phases  as  Turkey  has  started  to  attract  both  significant  long-term  foreign 
investment  as  well  as  short-term  investment  during  the  recent  era.  Furthermore,  a  new 
element of the reorganized or reconstituted domestic policy coalition is the group of important 
autonomous regulatory institutions pointing to a significant shift of power within the internal 
organization of the state itself to these new forms of bureaucratic institutions. 
 
An interesting question to consider which is somewhat beyond the scope of the present essay 
is whether the current policy phase in Turkey represents a major rupture or a real break with 
the past, putting an end to the cycle of periodic crises and breakdowns resulting in a new 
policy phase in line with the changing global context. This is a somewhat speculative question 
considering that we are still in the process of living through this particular policy phase. An 
optimistic assessment would suggest that Turkey’s economic performance has significantly 
improved  in  recent  years  judged  by  its  ability  to  achieve  high  growth  in  a  low  inflation 
environment,  which  renders  the  achievement  of  sustained  growth  over  time  a  stronger 
possibility  than  has  been  the  case  in  the  previous  eras.  What  may  also  make  one  more 
optimistic about the future is that Turkey has been able to attract significant flows of long-  22 
term investment for the first time in its post-war development trajectory. Furthermore, the EU 
anchor, in spite of its problems, constitutes a long-term external anchor. This again presents a 
certain  contrast  with  the experience  of  the  previous  decades  in  the  context  of  which  key 
international institutions have acted as temporary rather than long-term anchors, with their 
transformative impact often being restricted to the immediate or, at most as in the context of 
the 1980s to medium-term post-crisis restructuring process. On a less optimistic note, one 
could  also  draw  attention  to  elements  of  fragility  that  continue  to  exist  in  the  Turkish 
economy  such  as  a  large  current  account  deficit  and  a  heavy  domestic  and  external  debt 
burden. One should also take into account the fact that Turkey has benefited enormously, like 
all other emerging markets, from the unusually favorable global liquidity conditions in the 
post-2001 era. Clearly, a possible reversal of these conditions could undermine the optimistic 
scenario concerning the future path of the Turkish economy. Likewise, the inability of the 
economy to generate sufficient productive employment despite rapid rates of growth, in the 
face of strong supply-side pressures in the labor market, leaves unemployment as a major 
problem for the foreseeable future. Finally, the persistence of severe inequalities at all levels 
and deep-seated poverty may present a formidable obstacle for the sustainability of the recent 
favorable picture. 
 
The  foregoing  analytical  framework,  while  by  and  large  embracing  the  main  structural 
transformations in post-war Turkish economic development, still suffers from a number of 
shortcomings,  warranting  several  caveats.  First,  there  are  the  well-known  difficulties  of 
dividing a long period into distinct phases. Individual phases may not always show a uniform 
pattern over time. For example, although there is sufficient ground to describe Phase 1 as 
market based, one should not overlook the fact that there was a great deal of intervention by 
the government in industrial policy through the import and exchange rate regimes and also in 
the free functioning of the market mechanism through extensive price controls. Likewise, 
external factors, which were on the whole favorable in the first decade of Phase 2, present an 
altogether different picture in the second decade as relations with the United States turned 
sour following the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, adversely affecting Turkey’s relations with 
the IMF and the international financial community. Second, the factors to which we have 
attached primary importance in explaining the movement of the economy from one phase to 
another are accompanied and augmented by powerful exogenous events, having differential 
impact  on  the  course  of the  economy.  For  example,  the  Korean  War  facilitating  buoyant 
demand for Turkish agricultural exports in Phase 1, labor migration from Turkey to Western   23 
Europe and the concomitant inflow of sizable workers’ remittances as well as successive oil 
shocks in Phase 2, Iran-Iraq war providing an impetus for Turkish exports,  the hostilities in 
the  Eastern  and  Southeastern  regions  of  Turkey  over  the  Kurdish  question,  and  the 
devastating earthquake in the industrial heartland of the country  in Phase 3, and finally 9/11 
in Phase 4 constitute some of these factors that in different ways have had a bearing on the 
nature and duration of each phase. Likewise, the interruption of Turkey’s transient democracy 
on several occasions by military intervention, most notably in 1960, 1971 and 1980, although 
not  altogether  independent  of  developments  in  the  real  economy  should  also  be  included 
among such exogenous events shaping development. Third, the broad coalitions that have 
characterized each phase were not altogether free of inner tensions. For example, in Phase 2, 
the  deep  conflicts  that  bedeviled  the  First-five  year  plan  even  at  the  preparation  stage
7 
escalated in later  years  to stormy tensions between business interests and an increasingly 
vociferous organized labor. 
 
Upon  closer  examination,  several  additional  characteristics  of  post-war  Turkish  economic 
development based on the four-phase analytical framework presented above emerge. First, 
Turkey has moved very much with the tide of the dominant development discourse and acted 
in a similar fashion with the bulk of countries at a similar level of development. In contrast, 
countries, which have moved against the tide in some important respects, have been the most 
successful, as the experiences of South Korea and Taiwan in Phase 2 and India and China in 
Phases 3 and 4 have amply demonstrated.  Such observations call for the need to examine 
Turkish  economic  performance  in  different  phases  within  a  comparative  framework  with 
other countries at a similar stage of development. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to indulge into such comparisons,
8 efforts in that direction may shed some light, for 
example, on the reasons behind Turkey’s laggard record with respect to its production and 
labor market structure and key human development indicators. 
 
Second, Phase 2 stands out from the other three phases in some important respects. It is, 
especially in the first decade of this phase that Turkey comes nearest to showing some of the 
characteristics of a developmental and proactive state. Although external agents are at work 
they are very much in the background. External assistance is provided to support domestically 
determined development objectives as stated in five year plans. Moreover, the political regime 
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is more open than in the other phases. The domestic coalition is also distinctive in the sense 
that it includes broad segments of society, including labor. Third, although each phase has 
sufficient distinct characteristics facilitating the delineation of one from the other, one should 
not overlook the fact that, notwithstanding certain discontinuities they together represent a 
continuum, explaining a country’s development over more than half a century. In this process, 
there has, however, been a remarkably sharp change in the attitude of domestic policy makers 
towards  external  influence  in  economic  policy  making.  While  the  agriculture-based 
development strategy recommended by the World Bank was generally accepted in Phase 1, 
the  relations  between    the  World  Bank  and  the  Turkish  government  were  not  altogether 
amicable with the Turkish government showing a great deal of sensitivity to interference by 
the World Bank in domestic economic policy-making.
9 Likewise, the relations between the 
IMF and the Turkish government were far from being harmonious. The Turkish government 
was notorious in its failure not to stick to the initial agreements with the IMF for long in both 
Phase 1 and Phase 2. The relations between the IMF and the Turkish government reached 
their nadir at the end of Phase 2, at the height of the crisis in the late 1970s when the Turkish 
government showed considerable resistance to come to an agreement with the IMF.  There 
was  a  sharp  turnaround  in  the  attitude  of  the  Turkish  government  towards  both  of  these 
institutions in Phase 3 so much so that these two institutions took central stage in the design 
of economic policies in Turkey’s transition to the neo-liberal framework and increased their 
conditionality beyond the economic sphere in Phase 4, amidst charges in some quarters that 
Turkish economic policy-making is now altogether in their domain.  
 
 
    5. The Turkish Experience in a Broader Setting. The Continued Importance of 
State Capacity 
 
 
Turning from the Turkish experience to the general realm, the central diagnosis underlying 
the  neo-liberal  resurgence  in  development  theory,  which  subsequently  gave  rise  to  the 
“Washington  Consensus”,  was  that  “state  failure”  was  the  root  cause  of  weak  economic 
performance. The natural corollary of this line of thinking which dominated the practice of 
key multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank was to reduce the weight of 
the state in economic affairs and expand the domain of the market. In a way, “the state” and 
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“the  market”  were  juxtaposed  in  dichotomistic  terms:  the  “retreat  of  the  state”  was  a 
necessary state in the enlargement of the realm of the “free market”.
10 What is interesting is 
that the accumulating evidence on economic performance in the era of global neo-liberalism 
during the past two decades reveals a paradox. “State capacity”, in one way or another, has 
been quite central in the experience of the more successful set of countries in the new era, 
managing to capitalize on the potential benefits and minimizing the risks associated with the 
novel environment of neo-liberal globalization. Similarly, it was weak state capacity which 
accounted for the relatively less impressive economic performance of countries like Argentina 
and Turkey. The latter have failed to convert early surges in growth to a process of sustained 
economic growth which would enable them to converge steadily towards the living standards 
of advanced economies.  
 
A similar dichotomy can be observed in the literature on globalization versus the nation state. 
Early and simplistic accounts suggested that the process of globalization would necessarily 
undermine the power and influence of the nation state in a way as to render the nation state 
obsolete  over  time.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  forces  of  globalization  have  placed  major 
constraints on national economies and have, indeed, rendered certain specific instruments of 
economic policy quite redundant.
11 In the current international context, individual states find 
it  increasingly  difficult  to  implement  old-style  protectionism,  industrial  policies  based  on 
direct targeting of specific sectors, tight exchange controls over capital controls, extensive 
redistribution  through  large  welfare  states  and  the  like.  The  fact  that  certain  specific 
instruments are no longer implementable does not imply that the state, by definition, has lost 
all its relevance. In fact, the evidence increasingly suggests that state intervention, but through 
novel mechanisms and institutions, is the key to economic success in the experience of the 
emerging outliers ranging from China to India and Ireland in the new global context. 
 
Another key element that needs to be firmly integrated to the discussions of state capacity is 
the impact of the process of regionalization taking place concurrently with the process of 
globalization.  There  is  a  tendency  in  simplistic  accounts  to  assume  that  the  process  of 
regionalization  is  likely  to  undermine  state  autonomy  and  render  the  nation  state  quite 
obsolete.  Again,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  process  of  regionalization,  particularly  in  the 
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11 For an early study drawing attention to the limitations on the policy space of developing countries see Öniş 
(1998). For more recent attempts in the same direction concentrating mostly on the limitations imposed by the 
WTO on the policy autonomy of developing countries, see Wade (2003) and Akyüz (2007).   26 
context of formal arrangements like the European Union, results in a transfer of sovereignty in 
important ways from the nation state to supra-national institutions. But at the same time, 
active participation in regional experiments, such as membership of the EU, may help in 
improving state capacity, which also enables individual states to cope more effectively with 
the pressures and challenges of globalization. Hence, the issue of state capacity, in the current 
international  context,  should  be  approached  in  a triangular  fashion  in  which  the  complex 
interactions between states, regional entities and the global context need to be taken into 
account and investigated explicitly. 
 
    6. Pro-active versus Reactive States: Interpreting the Experiences of Hyper-
Growth Cases in the Age of Neo-liberal Globalization 
 
Our central contention is that state capacity matters in the age of neo-liberal globalization and 
following  Linda Weiss (1998) state capacity needs to be disaggregated into three distinct 
components: (a) the developmental or transformative capacity (b) the regulatory capacity and 
(c) the redistributive capacity or more broadly the ability to build social cohesion. What Weiss 
refers  to  as  the  “transformative  capacity”  of  the  state,  namely  “the  ability  to  coordinate 
industrial change to meet the changing international competition”, is in fact the development 
functions and capacities of the state (Weiss, 1998, p.7).  According to Weiss, whose account 
is clearly influenced by the experience of Asian developmental states, “state capacity in this 
context  refers  to  the  ability  of  policy-making  authorities  to  pursue  domestic  adjustment 
strategies  in  co-operation  with  organized  economic  groups,  upgrade  or  transform  the 
industrial economy” (Weiss, p.5). What is interesting in this definition is that there is no 
reference to specific instruments. The nature of the instruments may change both in line with 
the depth of development in the domestic industrialization process as well as the changing 
nature of the global economy and the constraints imposed by multilateral institutions. The 
focus on the transformative or the developmental capacity is important. But at the same time, 
it is incomplete in so far as it fails to take into account the other two dimensions of state 
capacity. These are also quite crucial in terms of the ability to generate sustained economic 
growth with social cohesion and to avoid costly financial crises in the process in the current 
international context and the distributional conflicts that often accompany them. 
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A cursory examination of comparative evidence suggests that the more successful states in the 
neo-liberal era have been pro-active states which have deviated from neo-liberal norms in 
certain crucial respects. There is no doubt that success is not associated with a process of self-
enclosure  and  inward-orientation.  Economies  that  have  managed  to  generate  high  growth 
have  been  generally  open,  outward-oriented  economies,  which  have  tried  to  capitalize  on 
export opportunities in the world market and long term foreign investment. At the same time, 
the  opening  up  of  this  process  has  been  based  on  a  gradual  and  controlled  liberalization 
process.  The  early  success  of  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  was  based  on  selective  industrial 
policy designed to create successful export industries. The more recent examples of China, 
India and Vietnam also point towards the importance of industrial strategies. Whilst all of 
these are outward-oriented models, with external competitiveness as their points of reference, 
none of these could be described as typical examples of free market models.  
 
The Irish case, recently described as “the Celtic Tiger”, is a striking case of a country which 
has  helped  to  develop  the  innovative  capacities  of  domestic  firms  whilst  trying  to  derive 
maximum opportunities from foreign investment opportunities at the same time. The Irish 
state has been quite successful in terms of integrating local firms into international networks. 
The  pro-active  policies  of  the  Irish  state,  through  new  institutions  such  as  the  Irish 
Development Agency,  has also been instrumental in attracting high-tech foreign investment 
to  Ireland  with  a  significant  spin-off  into  the  country’s  long-term  industrial  performance. 
(O’Donnell, 2004). In addition to providing developmental and transformational capacities for 
both national firms and transnational corporations in terms of a high quality labor force and 
physical and legal infrastructure, the Irish state has also displayed strengths in the other key 
spheres  of  state  capacity.  It  has  been  active  in  terms  of  developing  a  competitive  and 
regulatory environment conducive for investment. In addition, the “social partnership” model, 
in the context of which the Irish state was an important actor once again, was quite conducive 
for  the  achievement  of  social  and  political  stability  needed  for  long-term  productive 
investment. There is no doubt that the regional context was also important in Ireland’s ability 
to benefit disproportionately from the globalization process. Many European and American 
firms have taken up the opportunity to serve the European market from a low-cost and nearby 
location and have consequently taken the decision to restructure production in Ireland. 
 
The  key  lesson  here,  which  is  certainly  not  unique  to  Ireland  but  constitutes  a  common 
denominator in other successful European cases such as the recent revival of the Swedish   28 
model to successful Asian cases, is that the real economy matters. In line with this view, states 
try to adopt pro-active policies through various direct and indirect mechanisms to upgrade the 
performance of national firms as well as attracting in competition with other states the right 
kinds  of  FDI  needed  for  long-term  transformation.  As  the  experience  of  Ireland  clearly 
testifies the approach towards FDI is not a passive policy of creating the right environment, 
but a strategy that goes beyond this and tries to actively encourage the desired types of FDI 
through a variety of promotion and inducement mechanisms.  
 
Yet another important feature of the more successful pro-active states is that they are able to 
experiment with heterodox instruments such as controls over short-term capital flows. The 
evidence suggests that a number of important hyper-growth cases such as Malaysia and more 
recently other Asian economies which have actually experienced the crisis in 1997, such as 
South  Korea,  have  successfully  experimented  with  controls  over  short-term  capital  flows 
(Weiss, 2004). What is interesting here is that the more successful economies are the ones 
which are able to move beyond the confines of orthodox international financial institutions 
such  as  the  IMF  and  experiment  with  heterodox  policies  of  their  own,  a  process  that  is 
associated with a virtuous cycle of crisis-free growth. Whilst the traditional developmental 
state has been undergoing a drastic transformation in recent years, there is no evidence that it 
has been totally dismantled. In fact, it is argued that it was the strength of the real economy, 
itself, a by-product of the developmental capacities of the Korean state, which has been quite 
instrumental in the strong post-crisis recovery process of the Korean economy (Weiss, 2004). 
 
In contrast, the relative under-performers or moderate performers, meaning those countries 
that have failed to realize their true economic potential considering the post-war era as a 
whole, such as Argentina and Turkey have been characterized by reactive states and weak 
state capacities in comparative terms. For the past quarter century, these states have been 
reactive in the sense that they have tried single-mindedly to follow the precepts of orthodox, 
neo-liberal  recipes  without  in  any  way  attempting  to  go  beyond  these  recipes  and 
experimenting with alternative forms of openness and degrees of integration into the global 
economy. All out openness rather than controlled openness have characterized their strategies. 
In retrospect, state capacity has been weak in all three spheres. First, there was insufficient 
emphasis in developing the strength of the real economy. Second, key regulatory reforms 
which would have helped to prevent major economic crises have been delayed. Third, the 
states  concerned  were  not  able  to  engineer  social  cohesion  over  long  periods  of  time.   29 
Consequently, their development trajectories, in a liberalized capital account environment, 
depended heavily on inflows of short-term capital and a process of fragile, debt-led growth 
with costly repercussions. 
 
Having  made  these  points,  we  need  to  qualify  our  arguments  on  reactive  states  in  three 
important respects. Firstly, a reactive state does not necessarily mean a mild or a benign state. 
It is a well-known fact that both Argentina and Turkey during critical phases of their post-war 
development  have  experienced  breakdowns  of  democracy  and  highly  repressive  state 
behavior involving forced exclusion of popular groups from the political process. Secondly, 
countries with reactive states have enjoyed boom periods of rapid growth and during those 
periods  they  have  managed  to  accomplish  the  kind  of  growth  rates  comparable  to  star 
performers. The problem, however, was that these boom periods were short-lived and often 
ended  with  a  crises,  which,  in  turn,  helped  to  reduce  the  overall  rate  of  growth  by  a 
considerable  margin  over  time.  Thirdly,  countries  like  Turkey  and  Argentina  have  been 
performing unusually well in the recent era. Again, it is too soon to say whether this growth 
will be the kind of robust or durable growth which has characterized the experiences of the 
hyper growth cases. There is also an interesting problem of interpretation regarding the rather 
favorable  recent  macroeconomic  performance  of  these  two  countries.  Is  it  due  to  the 
improvement  in  the  regulatory  capacities  of  these  states  or  have  they  been  benefiting 
disproportionately from the unusual boom conditions in the international economy in recent 
years? 
 
Finally, an interesting question to pose in this context is whether there exists a link between 
state capacity and regime type in the current global context. Our basic conjecture here is that 
countries at the two polar ends of the spectrum namely established authoritarian regimes and  
established democracies appear to display superior state capacities. They are able to generate 
the kind of focus needed in terms of the development of longer-term supply-side policies as 
well as providing a more stable environment for long-term productive investment. In contrast, 
interim democratic regimes, with Argentina and Turkey clearly falling into this category, find 
it  particularly  difficult  to  develop  the  kind  of  state  capacities  needed  to  benefit  from  the 
globalization process on a substantial scale. The encounters of interim democratic regimes 
with  financial  globalization  are  typically  associated  with  costly  consequences.  This 
observation immediately highlights the importance of a favorable regional context in terms of 
helping to break this deadlock. The incentives provided by potential EU membership are quite   30 
critical in terms of facilitating the transition from an interim democracy to an established 
democracy and helping the process of institution building and the implementation of the rule 
of law which are likely to have a dramatic impact on the process of building state capacity and 
long-term  economic  performance  in  countries  located  in  this  category.  The  new  Eastern 
European members of the EU such as Poland have clearly benefited from this process and 
have found themselves placed on a crisis-free growth trajectory through a parallel process of 
democratization and institutional economic reforms from the mid-1990s onwards. A similar 
process is currently occurring in the Turkish context and arguably places Turkey on a more 
favorable  path  compared  to  Argentina,  where  regional  pressures  for  reform  under 
MERCOSUR are weaker compared with the mix of conditions and incentives provided by the 
EU. 
 
7.  Concluding Observations 
 
The present study has attempted to accomplish two separate but interrelated objectives. The 
first objective was to propose a general framework based on global-domestic interactions to 
account for the four major policy shifts in post-war Turkish development experience. The 
second objective was to highlight the importance of the distinction involving reactive versus 
pro-active states in accounting not only for major policy shifts over time but also for the 
differences  in  the  development  performances  of  individual  late  industrializing  countries. 
Furthermore, we have argued that the reactive versus pro-active state distinction is not only 
valuable for comparative-historical analysis but also continues to be relevant in the current era 
of neo-liberal globalization.  
 
The  recent  experience  of  countries  like  Turkey  suggests  that  even  reactive  states  can 
experience significant state transformation and a parallel improvement in state capacity with 
the primary impetus for change originating from external forces. There is no doubt that the 
regulatory arm of the Turkish state has improved considerably in the aftermath of the major 
financial crisis of 2000-2001. The crisis itself was instrumental in terms of building a broad 
domestic coalition in favor of stronger macroeconomic and financial regulation. Perhaps even 
more significant was the fact that the crisis empowered key external actors such as the IMF 
and the EU to push strongly in the direction of regulatory reforms and the development of the 
associated institutional capacity needed to implement such reforms. This brings us to a major   31 
element which differentiates the fourth and the most recent policy phase in Turkey from the 
earlier policy phases, namely the existence of a long-term external anchor in the form of the 
concrete  prospect  of  EU  membership.  The  transformative  impact  of  the  EU,  which  was 
clearly evident in other national contexts in Europe’s Southern and Eastern periphery during 
the 1980s and the 1990s,  was also very much in evidence in the recent Turkish context in the 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing realms of regulatory and democratization reforms. On 
the  assumption  that  Turkey  will  continue  to  make  further  progress  on  the  path  to  an 
established or a fully consolidated democracy, we are likely to be much more optimistic about 
its ability to make a radical break away from the boom-bust cycles which have been such a 
striking feature of its post-war development experience. 
 
Despite the existence of powerful external anchors, there is still need for decisive action on 
the domestic front, which would in the first place lead domestic actors to have a much bigger 
say in their interaction with the anchors. Although there has been increased transparency in 
the relations of Turkey with the international organizations such as the IMF, there is still little 
knowledge available about what goes on behind the scenes during negotiations, in particular 
on the effectiveness of domestic negotiators in putting forward an alternative case. A similar 
situation applies with respect to relations with the EU, the other powerful anchor. Turkey’s 
attempts to become a full member going back to nearly half a century during which Turkey 
has been the passive and docile partner forcing the doors to enter at all cost without many 
scruples about the terms of entry, are again facing some reluctance on the part of established 
member states.  
 
Based on the accumulated wisdom of the rich development experience at home and abroad 
and  recognizing  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  international  environment,  Turkey  should 
develop a more balanced development strategy, a strategy in which domestic agents occupy a 
more central and pivotal role and are engaged in a complementary relationship with external 
agents as opposed to a strategy which is primarily driven by external agents themselves. The 
fact that there is still a variety of approaches in terms of foreign trade, foreign investment, 
R&D  as  well  as    macroeconomic  and  exchange  rate  policies
12,  despite  the  more  or  less 
uniform application of neo-liberal economic polices through much of the developing world 
for more than a quarter century, should encourage domestic policy makers in this endeavor. In 
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line  with  its  determination  to  become  an  established  democracy,  the  main  objectives  and 
instruments  of  the  strategy  should  be  developed  with  the  full  participation  of  major 
stakeholders.  There  is  sufficient  domestic  expertise  to  give  Turkey’s  integration  with  the 
international economy a more developmentalist focus. Rather than accepting the continuous 
retreat  of  the  state  from  economic  life,  it  should  seek  ways  and  means  to  develop  state 
capacity in all of its three forms.  
 
Although  some  important  steps  have  been  taken  in  recent  years  to  develop  regulatory 
capacity, it is, yet, early to see the effectiveness of the new regulatory institutions in action. 
Simply  transferring  institutions  from  one  context  to  another  does  not  guarantee  their 
effectiveness  in  the  new  environment.
13  The  establishment  of  independent  regulatory 
institutions in the post-2001 crisis era was by no means a harmonious process free of political 
interference. While a lot of the effort for regulation in financial markets requires concerted 
international action, countries like Turkey which are particularly vulnerable to the speculative 
whims of financial investors should not be reticent in imposing defensive mechanisms.  
 
It is the other two aspects of state capacity that require even more urgent action. In terms of 
transformative capacity there is need for effective industrial policy to broaden the industrial 
base  towards  skill  and  technology  intensive  branches.  This  should  in  due  course  help 
Turkey’s current export structure, based on a handful of commodities headed by textiles and 
clothing to change to incorporate higher value added products with better prospects in world 
markets. The limitations imposed on nation states to implement independent macroeconomic 
and industrial polices through multilateral rules and obligations, especially in the post-WTO 
international  environment  notwithstanding,  there  is  room  for  maneuver  for  individual 
developing  countries
14,  especially  in  the  sphere  of  incentives  directed  to  research  and 
development and regional development.  
 
The redistributive capacity remains the weakest link in this respect with inequality at virtually 
all levels but especially in terms of gender based and regional inequalities placing Turkey 
among high inequality countries in terms of distribution of income and human development. 
Although there has been much talk about poverty alleviation, efforts in this direction have 
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after the 2001 crisis has not yet received wide acclaim in terms of its effectiveness.  
 
14 See Akyüz (2007) in this context.   33 
remained miniscule in the face of the scale and gravity of the problem. The biggest obstacle 
here remains in the redistributive component requiring in the final analysis the more active 
organization and participation of the lower income sections of the population in the political 
process. Turkey’s success in developing state capacity simultaneously in these three spheres 
no  doubt  depends  on  its  ability  to  create  the  supportive  institutional  framework  and  the 
emergence of a domestic coalition favoring such a transformation. 
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          ÖZET 
 
KÜRESEL DİNAMİKLER, ÜLKEİÇİ KOALİSYONLAR VE REAKTİF DEVLET: 
TÜRKİYE’NİN SAVAŞ SONRASI KALKINMASINDA ÖNEMLİ POLİTİKA 
DÖNÜŞÜMLERİ 
 
Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde Türkiye’nin iktisat 
politikalarında yaşanan önemli dönüşümleri açıklamaya yönelik bir kavramsal ve analitik 
çerçeve geliştirmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda bu uzun dönem, 1950, 1960, 1980 ve son 
krizin simgelediği 2001 yıllarında başlayan dört ayrı alt dönem çerçevesinde incelenmektedir. 
Bu alt dönemleri birbirinden ayrıştıran dönüşümler, en başta hakim dış güçlerin ve onların 
etkisi altındaki uluslararası kuruluşların belirlediği dış dinamikleri edilgen bir biçimde izleyen 
reaktif devlet temelinde açıklanmaktadır. Sadece dış dinamiklerin yeterli olamayacağı 
noktasından hareketle, ülke içinde dış kaynaklı etkileri destekleyen koalisyonların önemi 
üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu dönemde sık sık ortaya çıkan ekonomik krizlerin bir alt-
dönemden diğerine geçişteki etkileri de, önerilen analitik çerçevenin temel unsurlarından 
birini oluşturmaktadır. İç ve dış dinamikler ve dönemin siyasal gelişmeleri iktisadi etmenlerle 
birlikte ele alınarak dönüşümlerin bütüncül bir çerçevede açıklanılmasına çalışılmaktadır. 
Çalışmanın son bölümlerinde, Türkiye’deki gelişmeler mukayeseli kalkınma performansı 
temelinde değerlendirilmektedir. 1960 sonrasında Kore ve daha yakın dönemde de Hindistan 
ve Çin’in kalkınmacı ve pro-aktif devlet önderliğindeki yaklaşımlarının ekonomik performans 
açısından, Türkiye’nin de içinde bulunduğu reaktif devlet odaklı ülkelerine karşı bariz 
üstünlüğüne dikkat çekilmektedir. Son dönemde ekonomik performanslarıyla ön plana çıkan 
ülkelerin dışa dönük, ancak serbest piyasa koşullarına doğrudan bağlılık yerine, devletin 
kalkınmacı rolünü önemseyen ülkeler olduğuna işaret edilmektedir. Neoliberal küreselleşme 
sürecinde kalkınmacı ulus devletlerin rolünün önemli ölçüde aşınmasına ve ellerindeki 
araçların önemli bir kısmının etkisini kaybetmiş olmasına karşın, devletin bu dönemde de hala 
etkili bir rol oynayabileceğine dikkat çekilmektedir. Bu süreçte devletin rolünün sadece 
kurumsal düzenlemeler ve regülasyonla sınırlı olmadığı, bunun da ötesinde bölüşüm 
sorunlarına duyarlı ve sanayide rekabet gücünü artırıcı yönde etkili bir rol oynayabileceği 
vurgulanmaktadır. Bu farklı işlevlerin başarıyla yerine getirilmesinde temel etkenlerin devlet 
müdahalesinin yön ve kalitesi olduğu noktasından hareketle, İrlanda örneğinde olduğu gibi 
yeni mekanizma ve kurumların önemine işaret edilmektedir. Türkiye’nin de benzer bir 
doğrultuda hareket ederek, iktisat politikalarının belirlenmesinde ve uygulanmasında, devletin 
rolünü dışlamadan kendi tercihleri doğrultusunda belirlenen sanayileşme stratejisi ekseninde 
kalkınmacı bir rol izlemesi önerilmektedir. 
 
 
 